13/01/2026

VENEZUELA AS A STRATEGIC LABORATORY: POWER, SPHERES OF INFLUENCE, AND THE END OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER?

The United States’ intervention in Venezuela can be interpreted as a strategic signal with global reach. The conception of national security promoted by the Trump administration in December 2025 is grounded in an explicit logic of great-power competition and in the renewed valuation of spheres of influence as a guiding principle of the international system. The conduct of U.S. foreign policy becomes transactional and de-ideologized, with a reconceptualization of allies and adversaries based on contingent and short-term national interests. America First.

The Venezuelan case constitutes a critical precedent for Latin America and the Caribbean, but also for the rest of the world: it exposes the fragility of the principle of non-intervention and the vulnerability of states vis-à-vis intra- and extra-regional actors. In the Venezuelan case, the combination of military intervention, resource control, and political supervision/tutelage represents a structural shift in the relationship between sovereignty and international security, with potentially replicable effects in other states.

The gradual unraveling of the liberal international order

The U.S. intervention in Venezuela reflects the gradual unraveling of the liberal international order that emerged after the Second World War. In recent decades, the norms and institutions that once regulated international politics have lost their capacity to constrain state behavior. The narrative that “democracies do not go to war,” a central pillar of liberal peace, has been buried as a guiding principle.

This can be observed in a series of military and coercive actions that have shaped U.S. foreign policy, even in the absence of clear multilateral mandates. For example, under the second Trump administration and despite his promise to end wars and promote peace, direct attacks were carried out against nuclear facilities in Iran, without congressional authorization and justified on international security grounds; airstrikes in Syria targeting objectives linked to the Islamic State; operations in Iraq associated with the fight against armed groups; attacks in Nigeria against Islamic State militants in cooperation with local governments; and political and logistical support for Israel’s operations related to the desperate situation of the population in Gaza—a war with profound humanitarian and political implications for the region.

The Trump administration operates in a context marked by the relative decline of what was once the world’s hegemonic power and by the fragility of international mechanisms designed to contain unilateral actions. The absence of clear costs reinforces a power-based logic that erodes multilateralism and normalizes unilateral decision-making. Even more troubling is the absence (for now) of any actor capable of imposing meaningful constraints.

A history of U.S. interventions in Latin America

Over the past century, the United States has intervened on at least forty-one (41) occasions in Latin America and the Caribbean, through regime change, support for dictatorships, and covert operations. Historical examples include “the invasion of Grenada in 1983,” “support for military coups in Chile in 1973,” and “Operation Condor in the 1970s.”

In most cases, these interventions were justified in the name of democracy or human rights. These were the values that underpinned the decisions and formed part of liberal rhetoric.

In response to the intervention in Venezuela, the regional reaction was one of rejection and defense of sovereignty, albeit primarily at the discursive level, through official statements describing the intervention as a violation of international law and an affront to the sovereignty of peoples. Leaders such as Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva not only stated that it constituted a dangerous precedent, but also condemned the recent “armed intervention” by the United States in Venezuelan territory, arguing that he does not believe the solution to the country’s crisis lies in “the construction of protectorates,” but rather in “solutions that respect the self-determination of the people” of Venezuela. Chile and Uruguay issued similar statements. However, another group of states (Argentina, Paraguay, Ecuador, and Panama, among others), perhaps conflating a government with Maduro himself and an illegal act, or perhaps making an ideological reading (one that even the U.S. does not explicitly make), supported U.S. actions.

This underscores the region’s persistent structural weakness in generating a collective response capable of exerting effective influence.

In the contemporary context, countries such as Mexico and Colombia are closely observing how far the United States is willing to go and what the limits of its actions may be, as this intervention could be interpreted as a window through which both countries might see themselves reflected. Trump’s public accusations against Petro and their successive confrontations appear, for the moment, to have been eased after both leaders agreed to an upcoming meeting at the White House. Meanwhile, Cuba once again emerges as a directly implicated actor, given its history of confrontation with the United States.

The U.S. intervention in Venezuela thus functions as an example of the pressure that major powers can exert on state autonomy. In this case, it reflects a hybrid between the decisions of a declining power that has historically acted in particular ways to satisfy its national interests and the personalistic caprice of the president. Following the military operation that culminated in the capture of the Venezuelan president, Donald Trump made a public statement asserting that “international law would not be an effective constraint on U.S. foreign policy” and that only his “own morality” could contain his actions, thereby downplaying the relevance of the international legal framework.

International reactions

Europe responded with calls for moderation, respect for international norms, and the pursuit of a diplomatic solution, warning that the imposition of external solutions cannot replace legitimate internal political processes. Several European countries that were involved in the International Contact Group (GIC) in 2019 have already experienced how difficult it is to negotiate through imposition. The failed attempt to recognize Juan Guaidó as “interim president” and to impose a particular course of action on Maduro revealed the limits of such strategies. Confronting the United States is even more difficult within a complex transatlantic relationship. Europe once again opts for appeasement in its relations with Trump. The war in Ukraine, Trump’s demands for increased European military spending and greater responsibility for its own defense, his repeated expressions of disdain toward NATO “allies,” and the threat over Greenland together complete a picture that immobilizes Europe.

Major powers such as China and Russia reacted firmly. Russia condemned the intervention as a violation of sovereignty and reinforced its political backing for Caracas, warning of the risks of regional escalation. China, for its part, described the action as unilateral hegemony and emphasized the need to respect the UN Charter and the principle of non-interference. These reactions are part of a global dispute over the configuration of the international order, in which respect for sovereignty constitutes a central axis of contention.

Domestic and strategic risks for the United States

The intervention in Venezuela may become a political quagmire for Trump. It is unclear whether there is a Grand Strategy; a short-term blow does not guarantee long-term results. Domestically, prolonged political disarticulation or the absence of clear outcomes could erode political support and deepen divisions both within the government and among society—“his MAGA voters.” Foreign policy has evident limits when economic, political, or human costs begin to materialize.

Moreover, the likelihood of translating the intervention into concrete benefits—as Trump claimed one day after Maduro’s capture and the intervention—particularly in the oil sector, is limited and could require a great deal of time and substantial costs. The degradation of Venezuela’s energy infrastructure, institutional fragility, and persistent instability reduce the viability of sustained and profitable investments, even as Washington has promoted meetings with executives and oil reconstruction plans.

Venezuela as a laboratory of the new international order?

The Venezuelan case is not an isolated episode. It is part of a broader strategy aimed at redefining zones of influence, weakening multilateralism, and normalizing the unilateral use of power. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the presence of competitors such as China represents a limit that the United States is unwilling to tolerate.

Venezuela thus becomes a political and strategic laboratory in which an international order increasingly governed by shared norms gives way to one structured around power hierarchies and unilateral decisions. Perhaps the Grand Strategy is not Venezuela itself, but rather what Venezuela represents.

A dangerous precedent for Latin America and the Caribbean

If Venezuela comes to be accepted as a case in which sovereignty can be negotiated and intervention presented as a solution, the precedent is not Venezuelan—it is Latin American. What is normalized today in Caracas could tomorrow be replicated elsewhere on the regional map, further eroding the notion that Latin American states are sovereign and independent political entities.

The warning is clear: the underlying debate is not only about Venezuela, but about what kind of Latin America and Caribbean the region is willing to accept—and to resist—in the name of its own future.

Verónica Pérez Taffi is President of AERIA (Argentine Association of International Relations Studies). She serves as Director of the Bachelor’s Program in International Relations at Universidad del Salvador (USAL), and is a lecturer at the National University of Tres de Febrero (UNTREF) and the University of Palermo (UP). She is a PhD candidate in International Relations at USAL.