The Fragmentation of the Indigenous Popular Sector: Key to Understanding the 2025 Electoral Process in Bolivia

On August 17, 2025, general elections will be held in the Plurinational State of Bolivia. This electoral contest takes place in a context marked by historically low approval ratings for President Luis Arce (19.5%), a pervasive perception of socioeconomic decline (with 90% of Bolivians believing the country is on the wrong track), and an intensification of demands for political change.

According to official data from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, 7,937,138 citizens are eligible to participate in the first round. Under Bolivian electoral law, a candidate must secure at least 40% of valid votes and maintain a margin of no less than 10 percentage points over the runner-up to avoid a runoff, which is scheduled for October 19 if required.

The electoral register includes 7,567,207 voters within national territory and 369,931 abroad, enfranchised across 32 countries and 110 cities. Santa Cruz, with 2,071,967 registered voters, is the most electorally significant department, followed by La Paz (2,047,825) and Cochabamba (1,443,013). These three departments collectively account for 70% of the national electorate. In addition to the presidential and vice-presidential races, voters will elect 130 deputies, 36 senators, and 9 supra-state parliamentary representatives for five-year terms extending to 2030.

Bolivia currently faces a profound economic crisis, characterized by the end of the “gas boom,” depletion of international reserves, fuel shortages, annual inflation of 23.9%, recurrent road blockades, rotating shortages of basic goods, and heightened social mobilization. Analysts generally concur that the elections act as both a catalyst for the crisis and a test of the political system’s capacity to generate legitimate governance. The incoming president will face the urgent imperative of halting inflationary escalation.

A distinctive feature of this electoral cycle is the unprecedented fragmentation—after two decades—of the indigenous popular political constituency traditionally aligned with the Movement for Socialism (MAS).

The strategic positioning of former president Evo Morales remains a pivotal unknown. Observers identify two primary scenarios: (1) an explicit call for invalid votes, expressed through intentional ballot nullification as a reaction to the rejection of his candidacy; or (2) the obstruction of electoral processes in territories under his political influence, with the aim of delegitimizing the eventual winner. The outcome of these strategies may be shaped by what appears to be the scenario least favorable to Morales: a victory by Andrónico Rodríguez, which could undermine his longstanding hegemony over the MAS-aligned social base.

Potential Right-Wing Government Responses to the Crisis
 

A right-wing electoral victory would likely mark a reorientation toward orthodox liberal economic policies, entailing reduced state intervention, potential engagement with the International Monetary Fund, privatization of public enterprises, and expanded openness to foreign investment. Regardless of ideological orientation, any administration will face the dual challenge of curbing inflation and containing potential social unrest.

Historically, four presidents have resigned in the past four decades due to social conflict, prior to the MAS’s ascent to power. The current fragmentation of the indigenous popular sector into multiple parliamentary blocs, however, could—paradoxically—enhance governability by limiting the capacity for unified opposition mobilization.

In programmatic terms, Samuel Doria Medina frames the crisis primarily as a fiscal problem, advocating for the closure of public enterprises following efficiency audits and the pursuit of foreign loans. His business background and long-term residence in Bolivia have earned him, even among opponents, the perception of a nationalist political actor. Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga, by contrast, emphasizes revitalizing the gas industry and restructuring the lithium sector, representing a more overtly liberal agenda.

Institutional Roles in the Political Crisis

Judiciary
Bolivia is undergoing a phase of pronounced judicialization. Whereas the 19th century was dominated by parliamentarianism and the 20th century by caudillismo and strong executives, the contemporary period is marked by judicial primacy. The judiciary remains structurally politicized. Over the last decade, the Constitutional Court has issued only three major interpretations: one in favor of Morales during his presidency, and two against him after leaving office.

Catholic Church
In 2020, the Catholic Church, alongside the United Nations and the European Union, played a significant role in facilitating consensus around the electoral roadmap that led to Luis Arce’s election. Although such involvement appears unlikely in the current cycle, the Church’s institutional capacity for mediation positions it as a potential actor in the event of escalating political violence.

Armed Forces
The Armed Forces’ political role is institutionally circumscribed: in cases of electoral disruption or unrest, military or police intervention requires an explicit mandate from the Electoral Tribunal. Such an intervention remains improbable under current conditions.

Polling Dynamics
Bolivia’s electorate has historically been segmented into three roughly stable blocs: approximately 35% aligned with the indigenous popular sector (MAS base), 40% anti-popular, and 25% swing voters. Methodologically, surveys tend to overrepresent the indigenous popular vote due to both its greater reticence in self-reporting and the overrepresentation of metropolitan areas in polling samples.

Current polling places right-wing candidates Quiroga and Doria Medina in the lead, followed by Andrónico Rodríguez. While the right-wing vote appears consolidated, the undecided segment—estimated at 25–30%—is concentrated within MAS’s traditional constituency. Should this segment coalesce around Rodríguez, a divided right could enable him to lead in the first round and advance to a runoff against either Doria Medina or Quiroga.

Such an outcome, if not anticipated by polling data, could have significant implications for public perceptions of electoral integrity and confidence in the electoral authority. On the right, Doria Medina’s campaign infrastructure appears more robust than that of Quiroga or Manfred Reyes Villa.

Eva Copa, candidate of the left-wing MORENA party, withdrew from the race to avoid deregistration for failing to meet the vote threshold, focusing instead on consolidating her political base in El Alto ahead of the 2026 subnational elections.

Invalid Votes
 

Invalid votes may reach unprecedented levels in Bolivia, potentially surpassing individual candidate tallies. They attract three distinct voter profiles: supporters of Morales who perceive his exclusion as illegitimate; citizens broadly disillusioned with politics; and middle-class voters who had supported disqualified candidate Jaime Dunn—though this last group may ultimately back right-wing alternatives. Concerned about the potential magnitude of invalid votes, some candidates are discreetly promoting “split voting”: casting an invalid presidential vote while supporting a preferred candidate in single-member legislative contests. Notably, dedicated “invalid vote campaign centers” have been established in various regions.

With only days remaining before the electorate casts its ballots, the only certainty—reflecting broader regional patterns—is that the definitive outcome will likely be determined in the second round. In Bolivia’s current political configuration, however, the mere identification of the two candidates advancing to the runoff will constitute a critical political development in its own right.

Dolores Gandulfo has extensive experience in democracy, electoral systems, and human rights in Latin America and the Caribbean. She serves as Director of the Electoral Observatory of COPPPAL, is a member of regional observatories and networks, and has published widely on electoral observation and human rights. She directs the Diploma in Comparative Electoral Systems at the National University of Tres de Febrero (UNTREF), is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the National University of San Martín (UNSAM), holds a Master’s in Public Policy from Georgetown University, and a Bachelor’s in International Relations from Universidad del Salvador.