22/01/2026

PARAGUAY – UNITED STATES – BRAZIL. SECURITY AND ELECTIONS

On December 15, 2025, Paraguay’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rubén Ramírez, met in Washington with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. On that occasion, the signing of a cooperation agreement between the two countries—a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)—was announced, providing for the exchange of military and civilian personnel and their presence on Paraguayan territory.

The agreement does not clearly specify the conditions under which such personnel would operate in Paraguay. At first glance, it does not appear to involve the establishment of military bases in the neighboring country. Nonetheless, in the past there had already been discussions about the possible use of an airstrip in Paraguay’s Chaco region by U.S. forces.

According to the statement released by the U.S. Department of State:

“The historic agreement establishes a clear framework for the presence and activities of U.S. Department of Defense military and civilian personnel in Paraguay, facilitating bilateral and multinational training, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and other shared security interests.”

In principle, this new understanding between Paraguay and the United States might not be cause for immediate alarm. It does, however, raise concerns when viewed against the backdrop of repeated threats by the current U.S. administration: reclaiming control of the Panama Canal, annexing Greenland, pressuring Canada on trade and defense, confronting China and Europe, concentrating forces in the Caribbean, encircling Venezuela, sinking boats, seizing vessels, imposing arbitrary trade tariffs, abandoning multilateralism, among many others.

Why, then, should Paraguay’s rapprochement with the United States not come as a major surprise? Because Brazil has long been a privileged partner. To begin with, Brazilian companies hold the largest stock of foreign investment in Paraguay. Brazilian investment was already substantial in agribusiness and banking, and it expanded rapidly with the establishment of Brazilian industries and subsidiaries of multinationals—particularly auto-parts manufacturers—originally based in Brazil.

At the bilateral level, military cooperation is intense. At least forty Brazilian military personnel are permanently present in Paraguay on a rotating basis, providing troop training, marksmanship instruction, cavalry training, equipment maintenance, and other activities. The Brazilian Embassy in Asunción includes Defense Attachés (headed by the Army Attaché), as well as Navy and Air Force Attachés, in addition to officials from the Federal Revenue Service and intelligence services.

The relationship is fraternal, despite the fact that Paraguayan society has never fully overcome the trauma of the War of the Triple Alliance, even after 150 years.

There is a widespread but mistaken tendency to view Brazil’s relations with its neighbors as pendular, fluctuating according to ideological affinities. This is not the case. It is worth recalling that it was President Alfredo Stroessner, in the 1960s, who took the initiative to push eastward toward Brazil through the construction of the highway—now duplicated—that connects Asunción to Ciudad del Este. At that time, plans were already underway for the construction of the Itaipu hydroelectric plant, which would later become a symbol of the bilateral relationship.

It should also be recalled that Stroessner died in Brasília, where he is buried.

Paraguay’s case is peculiar. With the exception of a few brief periods—most notably the short liberal interlude under President Fernando Lugo—Paraguay has almost always been governed by the Colorado Party.

This pattern resumed after Lugo’s impeachment on June 22, 2012, approved by 39 votes to 4 in the Senate. Outraged by what they considered a hasty and poorly substantiated process, several South American countries, including Brazil, withdrew their ambassadors from Asunción. In Brazil’s case, the embassy was headed by a chargé d’affaires until November 2013, nearly a year and a half after the impeachment, when I assumed the post. I then had the opportunity and privilege to rebuild the bilateral relationship, engaging with a government guided by a “playbook” different from Brazil’s.

I presented my credentials to President Horacio Cartes a few days after my arrival. We always maintained cordial relations, both with him and with all his ministers, with whom I held frequent and constructive working and social meetings.

Even before Cartes’s election (2013–2018), the Colorado Party had already come under his leadership. The current president, Santiago Peña, served as his minister of economy and owes his political career to him. Horacio Cartes is probably the wealthiest individual in Paraguay. His business interests span virtually every sector, from banks and currency exchange houses to air taxi companies and agribusiness. In Brazil, he is best known for the manufacture of cigarettes smuggled into the country.

It is worth recalling that former President Cartes had been subject to U.S. sanctions—extended to his family—imposed by the last Democratic administrations in the United States. These sanctions were recently lifted, signaling yet another move toward rapprochement and support by President Trump for right-wing politicians and governments, both in the region and globally.

All of this unfolds within a broader effort to promote the spread of an ideology that proclaims itself libertarian and strongly pro-American. After Argentina, Paraguay, Chile, Bolivia, and several Central American countries have increasingly been drawn into this sphere of influence.

In Brazil–Paraguay relations, it is also significant that approximately 350,000 people of Brazilian origin—about 5 percent of Paraguay’s population, most of them gaúchos—live in Paraguay, primarily in the eastern part of the country. Their main hub is the city of Santa Rita, which even hosts a Centro de Tradições Gaúchas (CTG). Portuguese is commonly spoken there. Brazilians began migrating to Paraguay in the 1970s, attracted by lower land costs, and are primarily engaged in grain production for export. As one former Paraguayan president once remarked, “Brazilians taught us how to plant soybeans and introduced modern agriculture here.”

A more recent phenomenon, over the past decade, has been the establishment of industries with Brazilian capital. The leading sector is auto parts, supplying Brazilian and Argentine automakers and produced by multinationals to serve their affiliates in neighboring countries. Textile, footwear, packaging, and plastics industries have also been established. These investments are attracted by low labor and energy costs, as well as by reduced taxation under the maquila regime. This regime allows export-oriented products to use imported inputs duty-free, paying only 1 percent of the export value. Maquilas now account for a significant share of Paraguay’s export revenues and generate employment.

Returning to the Status of Forces Agreement, it is possible that it was pursued because Brazil is perceived as paying insufficient attention to Paraguay, doing less than expected. Despite long-standing awareness that the Paraguay–Brazil border is highly porous and largely uncontrolled—where murders and trafficking in arms, goods, and people occur daily—urgent and necessary measures have not been taken. It appears that Brazilian governments and citizens are content to accuse Paraguay of leniency toward criminality and move on. When disregarded, Paraguay turns to other allies who offer attention and assistance, including with the implicit aim of challenging Brazil’s leadership aspirations in the region.

There also remains a persistent tendency for criminals, politicians, and individuals convicted by Brazilian courts to seek refuge in Paraguay. There have been cases of Brazilian inmates in Paraguayan prisons living luxuriously, in apartments they themselves built and financed inside the facilities, equipped with home theaters, air conditioning, and high-quality food. These conditions fostered a practice that became habit and tradition. As a result, the first image of Paraguay that comes to mind for many poorly informed Brazilians is that of a lawless country, a vast marketplace of imported or counterfeit goods smuggled without control.

Against this backdrop, the understanding between Paraguay and the United States takes place precisely in the realm of security—a highly sensitive issue that will be central to Brazil’s 2026 presidential and state-level elections. The Status of Forces Agreement should therefore also be analyzed in the context of Brazil’s electoral cycle, as it underscores the vulnerabilities of governments that lack affinity or sympathy with Washington. By highlighting Brazil’s shortcomings in internal and external security, the objective is also to influence electoral outcomes, favoring candidates who are not identified with the political left.

José Eduardo M. Felicio served as Undersecretary General for Latin America at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as Brazil’s Ambassador to Uruguay, Cuba, and Paraguay, and as a senior official at the General Secretariat of the National Security Council of the Presidency of the Republic.