02/07/2025
The Idea.
When former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador promoted judicial reform, he pledged to bring about a “true democracy, where the people elect their representatives and public servants in all three branches of government.” On the evening of June 1st, President Claudia Sheinbaum echoed this vision, declaring the “full validity of popular power.”
The notion of making the judiciary accountable to the citizenry is compelling—not only in Mexico, but also across the region and globally—especially in light of persistently low public trust in judicial institutions, as revealed in reports such as Latinobarómetro. The 2024 edition of the survey reported an average regional trust level in the judiciary of just 28%.
A public opinion poll conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Mexico in December 2024 asked respondents how Supreme Court justices should be selected. Results showed that 38% favored popular vote, 25% preferred judicial appointment, 21% congressional appointment, and 12% executive appointment, with a small remainder abstaining.
Widespread perceptions of corruption, judicial inefficiency, and lack of legitimacy turned the government's proposal into a broadly supported initiative. Faced with this civic endorsement, the opposition found itself in the uncomfortable position of defending a discredited judicial system. Ultimately, the reform was passed by Congress and ratified by each of the country’s federative entities.
Following the approval of the reforms between September and December 2024, electoral authorities were tasked with adapting existing rules and procedures to implement an unprecedented type of election. The challenges were formidable: electoral institutions facing budget cuts, independent candidacies without political party backing, a numerical rather than a marked ballot system, the creation of new geographic units called “judicial electoral districts,” and a citizenry largely unaware of the offices being contested.
The Practice
A reductionist view would highlight the low voter turnout. Indeed, participation is a fundamental pillar of democracy, and it is undeniable that voter engagement legitimizes electoral processes. However, a deeper analysis reveals important qualitative insights into who voted and how they did so.
While turnout was just 13%, the electoral operation involved nearly 100 million eligible Mexican voters. Staff from the National Electoral Institute (INE) and 19 Local Public Electoral Bodies (OPLs) worked to construct an unprecedented process: harmonizing ballots, organizing information forums, and even designing voting simulators. Citizens themselves actively participated, staffing polling stations late into the day. In my observation in Iztapalapa, Mexico City, a citizen appointed as polling station president—facing the absence of his peers—personally knocked on neighbors’ doors to recruit replacements. These anecdotes contrast sharply with dominant narratives about the June 1st election.
The official voter turnout figure was provided by the INE. But beyond numbers, we encountered engaged citizens committed to electing impartial judges—“untainted by corruption, who neither release criminals nor unjustly condemn citizens.” Others, unable to discern candidates’ profiles or functions, opted to vote randomly, likening the process to a lottery.
An intriguing aspect of this election was the absence of party affiliation. In this vacuum, voters used the indicators of state authority (Executive, Legislative, Judicial) shown on the ballot as heuristic cues. These functioned as proxies for partisan identity. Meanwhile, the “Incumbent” label marked those seeking reelection.
Notably, INE data showed that over 20% of ballots for Supreme Court positions were either blank or nullified. This suggests a combination of factors: voter unfamiliarity with candidates, confusion about the ballot format, and expressions of discontent. While the precise motivation behind these votes remains unclear, all of these elements merit consideration ahead of the 2027 elections.
Lessons Learned
With a two-year window before the next judicial election, it is critical to reflect on lessons learned to enhance electoral equity, voter inclusion, and the intelligibility of the process.
One area for reconsideration is campaign financing. In the name of austerity, the reform did not provide public funding for electoral propaganda. Yet international standards for electoral integrity indicate that well-regulated public financing fosters fairness, while private funding systems disadvantage candidates lacking personal resources or access to credit and donor networks. In practice, this disparity affects both the right to stand for election and the right to vote. First, the absence of public funding forces candidates to self-finance their campaigns, leading to unequal competition. Second, it limits citizens’ ability to learn about the full range of candidates and proposals.
Although electoral bodies made significant efforts to inform the public about the voting method and ballots, future reforms should allocate media space for candidates to present their platforms and clarify the roles of the judges being elected—particularly given the range of jurisdictions and court levels involved.
To ensure electoral fairness, it may also be advisable to eliminate the ballot box indicating the nominating branch of government. This would help prevent both the politicization of candidacies and the stigmatization of incumbents seeking reelection.
We also recognize that this first implementation occurred within a compressed timeframe, and that ballot designs represented the best possible outcome given logistical and legal constraints. Nevertheless, improvements should be considered. On June 1st, voters spent between 10 and 30 minutes casting their votes, struggling with unfamiliar candidates and functions, and faced with lengthy ballots listing numerous judicial nominees. The widespread use of “accordion guides” was not merely an electoral gimmick, but rather a coping mechanism—citizens sought memory aids to navigate a chaotic array of options. Simplifying the election format could boost participation while curbing manipulative voter mobilization tactics.
In terms of electoral inclusion, it is essential to ensure that by 2027 both citizens living abroad and those incarcerated have the means to exercise their voting rights.
Finally, the issue of synchronizing judicial elections with executive and legislative contests merits attention. In 2024, concurrent elections occurred only in Veracruz and Durango, but in 2027 this could extend nationwide. Given that political parties were barred from participating in the judicial elections, the juxtaposition of partisan and non-partisan contests is problematic. It complicates electoral administration and requires additional consideration of the misalignment between electoral and judicial districts.
As stated at the outset, interpreting the June 1st election merely as a referendum on the Mexican government would be misleading. President Claudia Sheinbaum, elected with nearly 60% of the vote, enjoys popular support exceeding that of most regional leaders. The idea of electing judges democratically was also generally well received by the public.
This electoral outcome should be seen by both the governing coalition and the opposition as an opportunity to reconcile divergent positions—to bring majority interests into dialogue with the demands of those who, by popular mandate, currently represent political minorities. It is precisely within such pluralism that sovereign, people-centered governance finds its strength. A key challenge for the future will be to engage youth, who remained largely disengaged from this process.
These reflections are intended as a contribution to the strengthening of Mexican democracy. With an eye toward 2027, it is essential for the various branches of government, political leadership, electoral authorities, academia, and civil society organizations to use the lessons learned to draft a shared roadmap—one that makes future elections more accessible and comprehensible for all citizens.
Published in the journal “Voz y Voto”
 
Dolores Gandulfo is the Director of the Electoral Observatory of the Permanent Conference of Political Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean (COPPPAL) and of the Advanced Diploma in Comparative Electoral Systems at the National University of Tres de Febrero (UNTREF). She is a member of the Observatory of Political Reforms in Latin America and the Network of Female Political Scientists. Additionally, she is part of the Latin American Advisory Council of the Institute for Democratic Transitions (IFIT), the Argentine Association of International Relations Studies (AERIA), and the Juan Atilio Bramuglia Peronist Foreign Policy Center.
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